In this work we present novel differentially private identity (goodness-of-fit) testers for natural and widely studied classes of multivariate product distributions: Gaussians in R d with known covariance and product distributions over {±1} d . Our testers have improved sample complexity compared to those derived from previous techniques, and are the first testers whose sample complexity matches the order-optimal minimax sample complexity of O(d 1/2 /α 2 ) in many parameter regimes. We construct two types of testers, exhibiting tradeoffs between sample complexity and computational complexity. Finally, we provide a two-way reduction between testing a subclass of multivariate product distributions and testing univariate distributions, and thereby obtain upper and lower bounds for testing this subclass of product distributions.
Introduction
A foundation of statistical inference is hypothesis testing: given two disjoint sets of probability distributions H 0 and H 1 , we want to design an algorithm T that takes a random sample X from some distribution P ∈ H 0 ∪ H 1 and, with high probability, determines whether P is in H 0 or H 1 . Hypothesis tests formalize yes-or-no questions about an underlying population given a random sample from that population, and are ubiquitous in the physical, life, and social sciences, where hypothesis tests with high confidence are the gold standard for publication in top journals.
In many of these applications-clinical trials, social network analysis, or demographic studies, to name a few-this sample contains sensitive data belonging to individuals, in which case it is crucial for the hypothesis test to respect these individuals' privacy. It is particularly desirable to guarantee differential privacy [DMNS06] , which has become the de facto standard for the analysis of private data. Differential privacy is used as a measure of privacy for data analysis systems at Google [EPK14] , Apple [Dif17] , and the U.S. Census Bureau [DLS + 17]. Differential privacy and related notions of algorithmic stability are also crucial for statistical validity even when confidentiality is not a direct concern, as they provide generalization guarantees in an adaptive setting [DFH + 15, BNS + 16, RRST16].
While differentially private hypothesis testing has been extensively studied (see Section 1.4), almost all of this work has focused on low-dimensional distributions. The main contribution of this work is to give novel algorithms for hypothesis testing problems on high-dimensional distributions with improved sample complexity. In particular, we give differentially private algorithms for the following natural and fundamental problems:
1. Given samples from a multivariate Gaussian P in R d whose covariance is known to be the identity, decide if P is N (0, I d×d ) or is α-far from N (0, I d×d ) in total variation distance.
2. Given samples from a product distribution P over {±1} d , decide if P is the uniform distribution or is α-far from the uniform distribution in total variation distance.
3. Given samples from a product distribution P over {0, 1} d , decide if P is equal to some given extremely biased distribution Q with mean E[Q] O( 1 d ) or is α-far from Q in total variation distance. In this case our tester achieves the provably optimal sample complexity.
The main challenge in solving these high-dimensional testing problems privately is that the only known non-private test statistics for these problems have high sensitivity. That is, these test statistics can potentially be highly brittle to changing a single one of the samples. We overcome this challenge by identifying two effective test statistics with lower sensitivity. The first statistic is obtained by a novel application of the method of Lipschitz extensions [BBDS13, KNRS13] . The second statistic is obtained using a new private preconditioning method [KLSU19] , which gives a computationally efficient tester, albeit with larger sample complexity in some parameter regimes.
Background: Private Hypothesis Testing
We start by giving some background on private hypothesis testing. First, when we say that we want a differentially private hypothesis tester for a pair H 0 , H 1 over domain X , we mean that we seek an algorithm A : X * → {0, 1} such that 1. A is ε-differentially private in the worst case. That is, for every pair of samples X, X ′ ∈ X n differing on one sample, A(X) and A(X ′ ) are ε-close in a precise sense (see Definition 2.1).
2.
A correctly distinguishes H 0 from H 1 on average. If X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is drawn i.i.d. from some P ∈ H 0 then A(X) outputs 0 with high probability, and similarly if P ∈ H 1 . We call the minimum number of samples n such that A distinguishes H 0 and H 1 the sample complexity of A.
Note that we require testers that are private in the worst case, even though we only require accuracy on average. It is indeed important for privacy to be a worst-case notion, rather than relying on the assumption that the data is sampled i.i.d. from some P ∈ H 0 ∪ H 1 because we have no way of verifying this assumption (which may anyway be an oversimplified modeling assumption), yet once privacy is lost it cannot be recovered.
There exists a black-box method for obtaining a differentially private tester from any nonprivate tester A using the sample-and-aggregate framework [NRS07] . Specifically, given any tester A with sample complexity n, we can obtain an ε-differentially private tester with sample complexity O(n/ε). When ε is a constant, the reduction is within a constant factor of the best sample complexity; however, the sample complexity blows up as ε → 0.
One can often obtain stronger results using a white-box approach. For example, suppose P is a Bernoulli random variable and we aim to test if P = Ber(1/2) or P = Ber(1/2 + α). Non-privately, Θ(1/α 2 ) samples are necessary and sufficient. Thus the black-box approach gives a sample complexity of Θ(1/α 2 ε).
However, if we work directly with the test statistic T (X) = 1 n n i=1 X i , we can obtain privacy by computing T (X) + Z where Z is drawn from an appropriate distribution with standard deviation O(1/(εn)). One can now show that this private test succeeds using n = O 1 α 2 non-private sc
samples, which actually matches the non-private sample complexity up to a factor of 1 + o(1) unless ε is very small. Our main contribution is to achieve qualitatively similar results for the high-dimensional testing problem we have described above.
Our Results
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). There is a linear-time, ε-differentially private tester A that distinguishes the standard normal N (0, I d×d ) from any normal N (µ, I d×d ) that is α-far in total variation distance (or, equivalently, µ 2 ≥ α) using n = n(d, α, ε) samples for 
The sample complexity in Theorem 1.1 has an appealing form. One might even conjecture that this sample complexity is optimal by analogy with the case of privately estimating a Gaussian with known covariance, for which the sample complexity isΘ(d/α 2 + d/αε) [KLSU19] . However, the next result shows that there is in fact an exponential-time private tester that has even lower sample complexity in some range of parameters.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal).
There is an exponential-time ε-differentially private tester A that distinguishes the standard normal N (0, I d×d ) from any normal N (µ, I d×d ) that is α-far in total variation distance using n = n(d, α, ε) samples for 
The expression for the sample complexity in (3) is rather complex and somewhat difficult to interpret and compare to (2). One way to simplify the comparison is to consider the range of the privacy parameter ε where privacy comes for free, meaning the sample complexity is dominated by the non-private term Θ(d 1/2 /α 2 ). For the efficient algorithm, privacy comes for free roughly when ε = Ω(α). For the computationally inefficient algorithm, however, one can show that privacy comes for free roughly when ε = Ω(α 2 + α/d 1/4 ), which is better as soon as both 1/α, d → ∞.
Our results for multivariate Gaussians follow by reduction from analogous results for uniformity testing of Boolean product distributions; that is, the problem of deciding, given samples from a distribution over {±1} d , whether it is uniform or far from uniform.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal).
There is a linear-time, ε-differentially private tester A that distinguishes the uniform distribution over {±1} d from any product distribution over {±1} d that is α-far in total variation distance using n = O(
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). There is an exponential-time, ε-differentially private tester A that distinguishes the uniform distribution over {±1} d from any product distribution over {±1} d that is α-far in total variation distance using n = O(
We, in fact, show how these two results on uniformity testing of Boolean product distributions imply the analogue results of Theorem 1.1 and 1.2, via a reduction argument (Theorem 3.1). For completeness, and to circumvent the constant-factor losses incurred by this reduction, we also provide a self-contained (efficient) Gaussian testing algorithm in Appendix A.
Using a simple reduction (Corollary 5.2), Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 extend, with a constant factor loss in sample complexity, to testing whether (i) a product distribution P over {±1} d is either equal to some fixed product distribution Q such that every coordinate of E[Q] is bounded away from −1 and +1, or (ii) whether P is far from Q in total variation distance.
Finally, we focus in Section 6 on a specific class of Boolean product distributions, which we refer to as "extreme." (Loosely speaking, a product distribution is extreme if each of its marginals is O(1/d)-close to constant.) For this restricted class of Boolean product distributions, we provide a two-way reduction argument showing that identity testing is equivalent to the identity testing in the univariate setting. This allows us to transfer known lower bounds on private univariate identity testing to our extreme product distribution class, which gives us the first non-trivial lower bounds for privately testing identity of product distributions. Theorem 1.5 (Informal). The sample complexity of privately testing identity of univariate distributions over [d] and the sample complexity of privately testing identity of extreme product distributions over {±1} d are equal, up to constant factors.
Useful Tools for Non-Private Hypothesis Testing
We highlight some tools in this paper which are useful for hypothesis testing, even without privacy constraints.
• A reduction from testing the mean of a Gaussian, to testing uniformity of a product distribution (Theorem 3.1).
• A reduction from testing identity to a "balanced" product distribution, to testing uniformity of a product distribution (Corollary 5.2).
• An equivalence between testing identity over a domain of size d, and testing identity to an "extreme" product distribution in d dimensions (Theorem 6.2).
Techniques
To avoid certain technicalities involving continuous and unbounded data, we will describe our tester for product distributions over {±1} d , rather than for Gaussians over R d . However, the techniques used in both cases are broadly similar.
First Attempts. A natural starting point is to study the asymptotically-optimal non-private tester of Canonne et al. [CDKS17] . Let P be a distribution over {±1} d and let X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ {±1} n×d be n i.i.d. samples from P . Define the test statistic
The analysis of Canonne et al. shows that if P is the uniform distribution then E[T (X)] = 0, while if P is a product distribution that is α-far from uniform then E[T (X)] ≥ 1 2 α 2 n 2 . Moreover, for some n = O(d 1/2 /α 2 ), T (X) concentrates around its expectation well enough that we can distinguish between these two cases.
The standard approach to obtaining a private tester is to add noise to the statistic T (X) calibrated to its global sensitivity, which is defined as
where X ∼ X ′ denotes that X and X ′ are neighboring samples that differ on at most one sample. To ensure privacy it is then sufficient to compute a noisy statistic T (X) + Z where Z is chosen from an appropriate distribution (commonly, a Laplace distribution) with mean 0 and standard deviation O(GS T /ε). Thus, it is enough to add noise O(dn/ε). In order for the noise we add for privacy not to overwhelm the signal of the tester, we then need dn/ε ≪ α 2 n 2 , which requires us to take n = Ω(d/α 2 ε), resulting in an undesirable linear dependence in d. In particular, this is dominated in all parameter regimes by the sample-and-aggregate approach. In view of the above, one way to find a better private tester would be to identify an alternative statistic for testing uniformity of product distributions with lower global sensitivity. However, we do not know of any other such test statistic that has asymptotically optimal non-private sample complexity; a prerequisite to achieving optimal private sample complexity.
Intuition: Global Sensitivity vs. Average Sensitivity. Since we need privacy to hold in the worst case for every dataset, any private algorithm for computing T must have error proportional to GS T on some dataset X. However, the utility of the tester only applies on average to datasets drawn from product distributions. Thus, we can try to find some alternative test statisticT that is close to T on average but has lower global sensitivity.
For simplicity, we will focus on constructing a test statisticT that agrees with T on average over the uniform distribution U over {±1} d . Of course, this will not be enough for our purposes, since we do not know that the data comes from the uniform distribution-if we did, we would not need to run the tester at all. However, it will give a sense of the techniques that go into our construction and why they lead to improved sample complexity. Handling the full range of product distributions will require some additional steps, and will increase the sample complexity beyond what is suggested by this sketch.
To this end, we can start by examining the sensitivity of T more closely. If we fix a pair of neighboring samples X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and X ′ = (X ′ 1 , . . . , X n ) then a calculation (see Section 4.1) shows
Looking at (4), we can upper bound the global sensitivity of T by applying the simple inequality
This upper bound can indeed be tight in some cases, namely when X j = (+1, . . . , +1) for every j and X ′ 1 = (−1, . . . , −1). Yet, such datasets are extremely unlikely to arise under the uniform distribution, and we can hope that the sensitivity ofT can be much lower if it does not have to agree with T on such datasets.
To get some intuition for why restricting to the uniform distribution helps, suppose that X 1 , . . . , X n , X ′ 1 are i.i.d. samples from U . Then it is not too difficult to show that the average sensitivity is AS T,U = E
which is dramatically lower than the global sensitivity. If we could somehow add noise proportional to AS T,U then the noise would be only O((d + (dn) 1/2 )/ε). To make the noise small relative to the signal of the tester, it would suffice to take n = O(d 1/2 /αε 1/2 + d 1/3 /α 4/3 ε 2/3 ), yielding a remarkable improvement over the previous attempts. Unfortunately, adding noise to T proportional to AS T,U is not enough to ensure differential privacy, but we can nonetheless use this example as a guide towards finding a low-sensitivity test-statisticT .
Reducing the Sensitivity. The next step, which is novel to our work, is to observe that the bound of X 1 ,X ≤ X 1 1 X ∞ is only tight when X 1 andX point in the same direction. But for datasets that are drawn from the uniform distribution, the bound can be improved by using the fact that X 1 , X ′ 1 , andX are typically nearly orthogonal. That is, if X 1 , . . . , X n were drawn from the uniform distribution, then with high probability we have
Thus, if we could somehow restrict attention to datasets satisfying (5), we could significantly reduce the sensitivity ofT . However, our tester needs to be defined for all datasets, so it is not a priori obvious how to use this fact to obtain a tester with low sensitivity. Nonetheless, we can construct such a tester in two different ways, leading to different guarantees.
Lipschitz Extensions. The first method is to use the beautiful machinery of privacy via Lipschitz extensions introduced by Blocki et al. [BBDS13] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [KNRS13] in the context of node-differential-privacy for graph data. The idea here is simple: we know that with high probability the dataset will fall in the set C ∆ ⊆ {±1} n×d defined by
for an appropriate value of ∆. We also know that the sensitivity when restricted to datasets in C ∆ is small, namely RS T,C ∆ = max
In our case ∆ will correspond to (5), but will be slightly larger to accommodate distributions that are not uniform yet are not "blatantly" non-uniform.
What we need to compute is a Lipschitz extension of T . That is, a functionT defined on all of {±1} n×d such that: (1)T agrees with T on C ∆ , namelyT (X) = T (X) for every X ∈ C ∆ . (2) T has low global sensitivity, namely GST = RS T,C ∆ ≤ 4∆. Perhaps surprisingly, such a Lipschitz extension exists for every real-valued function T and every subset of the domain
Once we haveT , we can simply add noise to it proportional to O(∆/ε), and accuracy will follow from the fact that, for datasets drawn from the uniform distribution, T (X) =T (X) with high probability.
The drawback of this approach is that the functionT is not necessarily efficiently computable, and in general the only way to computeT may in the worst-case require enumerating over all 2 nd datasets in {±1} n×d . We do not know any way to computeT efficiently, but we give a simple, computationally efficient alternative with larger sample complexity.
Filtering. The second method is to filter out any sample X j such that | X j ,X | > ∆ and replace it with a fresh uniform elementX j of {±1} d , for which | X j ,X | ≤ ∆ with high probability. However, because the data-dependent quantityX affects the transformation of every sample, the resulting algorithm might not have low global sensitivity. Specifically, changing one row of the dataset might change many values ofX, and thus change many rows of the filtered dataset.
We circumvent this problem by first computing a differentially private estimateX ≈X, and instead filtering out any sample X j such that | X j ,X | > ∆ ′ . This method is simple and computationally efficient. One can show that it indeed preserves differential privacy (see Section 4.2) because, intuitively, it acts as a sort of Lipschitz extension from the set C ∆ ′ . Unfortunately, because of the noise introduced for privacy, our estimates of X j ,X are only accurate to withiñ O(d/ε), forcing us to choose ∆ ′ = ∆ +Õ(d/ε), which in turn increases the sensitivity, leading to the bound in Theorem 1.3.
Related Work
Over the last couple decades, there has been significant work on hypothesis testing with a focus on minimax rates. The starting point in the statistics community could be considered the work of Ingster and coauthors [Ing94, Ing97, IS03] . Within theoretical computer science, study on hypothesis testing arose as a subfield of property testing [GGR96, GR00] The Lipschitz-extension technique that we build upon was introduced in [BBDS13, KNRS13] , who also gave efficient Lipschitz extensions for graph statistics such as the edge density and the number of triangles in sparse graphs. Later work constructed efficient Lipschitz extensions for richer classes of graph statistics [RS16, SU19] . A closely related work of [CD18] introduced a variant of the Lipschitz-extension machinery and showed how to construct efficient extensions for statistics such as the median and trimmed mean. Recent results [BCSZ18b, BCSZ18a] prove the existence of Lipschitz extensions for all differentially private algorithms, though efficiency is not a focus.
Preliminaries 2.1 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy is a property that a randomized algorithm satisfies if its output distribution does not change significantly under the change of a single data point.
Let S, S ′ ∈ S n be two datasets of the same size. We say that S, S ′ are neighbors, denoted as S ∼ S ′ , if they differ in at most one data point.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy, [DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm
Algorithm A is ε-differentially private if it satisfies the definition for δ = 0.
Differential privacy satisfies the following two useful properties.
A common technique that differentially private mechanisms use is to add zero-mean noise of appropriate scale to the quantities computed from the dataset. The scale of the noise depends on the sensitivity of the function of the dataset we aim to compute. Intuitively, the sensitivity represents the maximum change that the change of a single data point can incur on the output of the function.
Definition 2.4 (ℓ 1 -and ℓ 2 -sensitivity). Let f :
Respectively, the ℓ 2 -sensitivity of f is ∆ 2 f = max
Two standard differentially private mechanisms, which are used very often as building blocks, are the Laplace and the Gaussian Mechanism.
Lemma 2.5 (Laplace Mechanism, [DMNS06] ). Let f : S n → R, a dataset S ∈ S n , and privacy parameter ε. The Laplace Mechanism
is ε-differentially private and with probability at least
Lemma 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism, [DKM + 06]). Let f : S n → R d , a dataset S ∈ S n , and privacy parameters (ε, δ). The Gaussian Mechanism
is (ε, δ)-differentially private and with probability at least 1
Useful Facts on Distances Between Multivariate Distributions
We here record some lemmata which will be useful to us, relating total variation distance (equivalently, L 1 ) between the multivariate distributions we consider to the ℓ 2 distances between their mean vectors.
The first is relatively standard; for the specific constants stated below, it is a direct conse-
The second relates, similarly, L 1 distance between product distributions over {±1} d to the ℓ 2 distance between their means, however with a caveat -namely, at least one of the distributions needs to be "balanced," i.e., have all its marginals "not-nearly constant." Lemma 2.8. Fix τ ∈ (0, 1], and let P, Q be product distributions over {±1} d with mean vectors
where C τ , c τ > 0 are two constants depending only on τ . Moreover, one can take
Proof. The upper bound follows from [CDKS17, Corollary 3.5] (note that their parameterization is for P, Q over {0, 1} d ). As for the lower bound, it is proven analogously to [KLSU19, Lemma 6 .4]; with two main differences. First, their lemma is stated for τ = 2/3, whereas we allow it to be an arbitrarily small constant -the same argument carries through, albeit at the cost of larger constant factors in the bound. Second, their lemma requires that both P and Q be balanced, whereas we only require one to be balanced. This can be dealt with by noting that if one distribution is not balanced in some coordinate, the difference in means in this coordinate is sufficient to witness a large total variation distance.
From Gaussian to Product-of-Bernoulli Testing
In this short section, we provide a simple argument which enables us to transfer all our results on uniformity testing for product-of-Bernoulli distributions (described next, in Section 4) to testing identity of multivariate Normal distributions. Specifically, we analyze a simple reduction which maps a sample from an unknown multivariate normal N (µ, I d×d ) to a sample from a product distribution P µ on {±1} d , such that the standard Normal N (0, I d×d ) is mapped to P 0 = U d , while any Normal α-far from N (0, I d×d ) is mapped to some P µ that is Ω(α)-far from U d .
Theorem 3.1. There exists a function F : R d → {±1} d and an absolute constant c > 0 such that the following holds. For µ ∈ R d , denote by P µ the distribution of F (X) when X is drawn from N (µ, I d×d ). Then
Moreover, F is computable in linear time.
Before providing the proof of the theorem, we note that, with this reduction, Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 directly follow from their respective counterparts, Theorems 1.3 and 1.4.
; thus trivially implying the first item, as well as the time-efficiency statement and the fact that P µ is a product distribution. We turn to the remaining part of the second item. Fix any µ ∈ R d , and define for convenience α := N (µ,
Therefore, the mean vector µ ′ of P µ satisfies
the first inequality by Lemma 3.2 (which we will prove momentarily) and the last by our above lower bound on µ 2 . This shows that µ ′ 2 > α/12. Applying finally Lemma 2.8 (with Q = U d , for which τ = 1), we get existence of an absolute constant c > 0 such that
The above argument relied on a technical lemma about the error function Erf, which we state and prove below.
Proof. Consider the functions g(t) = (Erf(−t)) 2 and f (t) = g(t)
t 2 for t > 0. It holds that
Thus,
Now consider the function f (t) in (0, ∞).
By inequalities (7) and (8), we conclude that |Erf(−t)| ≥ 0.84 · min{|t|, 1} for t > 0 and the claim follows by symmetry.
Uniformity Testing for Product-of-Bernoulli Distributions
In this section we introduce our algorithms for uniformity testing. Both algorithms use a noisy version of the test statistic for uniformity testing introduced in [CDKS17] :
The tests differ in the way that they reduce the sensitivity of the test statistic, giving tradeoffs between sample complexity and computational complexity.
A Computationally Inefficient Private Algorithm
In this section we focus on a computationally inefficient algorithm for uniformity testing based on Lipschitz extensions. Specifically, we identify a subset set of datasets for which the sensitivity of T on these datasets is low and we compute a test statisticT that agrees with T on this subset, but has low sensitivity on all datasets. The existence of such a Lipschitz extension is guaranteed by the McShane-Whitney extension theorem [McS34] ; however, the construction of Lipschitz extensions is not efficient in general. In the next section, where we focus on the efficient construction, we will replace the Lipschitz extension by an efficient algorithm that attempts to achieve a similar objective.
Let P = P 1 × · · · × P d be a product distribution over {±1} d , which is specified by its mean
We will denote the product of d independent copies of the uniform distribution by U d . We draw samples from distribution P and aim to distinguish between the cases P = U d and P − U d 1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3.
Algorithm 1 Private Uniformity Testing via Lipschitz Extension
Require: Sample X = (X (1) , . . . , X (n) ) ∈ {±1} n×d drawn from P n . Parameters ε, α, ∆ 1/50 > 0.
Stage 2: Lipschitz extension 4: Define the set C = X ∈ {±1} n×d ∀j ∈ [n] | X (j) ,X | ≤ ∆ 1/50 . 5: LetT (·) be a 4∆ 1/50 -Lipschitz extension of T from C to all of {±1} n×d .
Stage 3: Noise Addition and thresholding 6: Let r 2 ∼ Lap(4∆ 1/50 /ε) and z 2 ←T (X) + r 2 .
The main theorem of this section is the following:
Theorem 4.1. Given any choice of ∆ 1/50 , Algorithm 1 is 2ε-differentially private. Furthermore, for an appropriate choice of parameter ∆ 1/50 , Algorithm 1 can distinguish between the cases P = U d and P − U d 1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3 and has sample complexity
Our test is a private adaptation of the test from [CDKS17] . First let us recall the guarantees of the test statistic T developed in [CDKS17] . In their work, Canonne et al. use Poisson sampling; however the interplay between privacy (which is defined with regard to a fixed set of samples) and Poisson sampling (where the number of samples is itself randomized) is tricky at best. For this reason, we state a version of their result without Poisson sampling.
Lemma 4.2 (Non-private Test Guarantees).
For the test T defined in (9), the following hold:
Proof. Note that, for any 1 
and a simple computation yields
2 ≥ α 2 /2 (by Lemma 2.8). Thus, this establishes the claimed bounds on the expectation of the statistic.
Turning to the variance, assume first that P = U d , i.e., p 2 = 0. In this case,
expanding the square and using the expression for the first to fourth moments of a Bin(n, 1/2) random variable. For general P , one can compute explicitly this quantity, to obtain
We first focus on the privacy guarantee of Theorem 4.1. The mechanism is the composition of two invocations of the Laplacian mechanism in line 2 and line 6. Our privacy proof is based on the existence of Lipschitz extensions, as established by the following theorem.
In this work, we will invoke the the McShane-Whitney extension theorem with the metric space M being the space of databases with the metric induced by the neighboring relation.
The main element that we need for the privacy proof is the bound on the sensitivity of T on C. This would ensure that T is 4∆ 1/50 -Lipschitz on C, so the (4∆ 1/50 )-Lipschitz extensionT exists and line 6 adds enough noise to maintain privacy. Note that, while the algorithm will be private regardless of the value of ∆ 1/50 , in order to ensure accuracy, we will choose it so that probability of a dataset falling into the corresponding set C is sufficiently high.
Lemma 4.4 (Sensitivity of T). For two neighboring datasets
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that X and X ′ differ on the n-th sample. Then, we can write X = (X (1) , . . . , X (n) ) and X ′ = (X (1) , . . . , X ′(n) ). We can now calculate the difference:
Therefore, we have
Observe that, because X
, as stated earlier, in (4). This readily implies the bound
Since X, X ′ ∈ C, we know that X (n) ,X ≤ ∆ 1/50 and X ′(n) ,X ′ ≤ ∆ 1/50 . It follows that
Lemma 4.5 (Privacy). Algorithm 1 is 2ε-differentially private.
Proof. Algorithm 1 is a composition of two invocations of the Laplacian Mechanism, in step 2 and step 6. By Lemma 2.5, both steps are individually ε-differentially private. Since these are the only steps that access the data, the privacy guarantee follows from Lemmas 2.3 and 2.2.
We now turn to the utility guarantee of Theorem 4.1. The crux of the proof can be summarised as follows:
1. If P = U d , then with high probability X passes the first check at line 3.
2. We can choose ∆ 1/50 such that:
(a) If X passes line 3 then it belongs in C with high probability, so T (X) =T (X).
(b) The amount of noise added toT (X) is small enough that one can still distinguish between the two hypotheses.
We start by proving that if P = U d , then with high probability X is not rejected at line 3. Since we are allowed to fail with probability 1/3, each step of the algorithm is allowed to fail with constant probability. We will prove a slightly more general statement than we need, where we keep track of the failure probability, because these more general statements will be useful in the following section. In the remainder of this section, one can think of setting β to be a small constant, say 1/50.
Lemma 4.6. With probability at least 1 − 3β,
. EachX i is a sum of n independent random variables in [−1, 1], therefore, by Hoeffding 's inequality, it holds that
Therefore, by a union bound, with probability at least 1 − 2β,
. By Lemma 2.5, it holds that with probability 1 − β, |r 1 | ≤ 2 ε ln 1 β . We conclude that if P = U d , then with probability 1 − 3β,
Lemma 4.7. Let X be a dataset that passes line 3 of Algorithm 1. With probability 1 − 5β, for all x ∈ X,
For all k ∈ [n], X (k) 2 2 = d, so we focus on the second term. Let r 1 ∼ Lap(2/ε) as in step 3 of Algorithm 1. By Lemma 2.5, with probability at least 1 − β, |r 1 | ≤
Since |X
The samples are drawn independently, therefore E X
. By (12) and Hoeffding's inequality, it follows that with probability 1
The latter also implies that with probability 1 − 3β, since |X
The samples are independent, so by inequalities (14) and (15),
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 3β, for all k ∈ [n],
By inequality (13), with probability at least 1 − 3β, it holds that
Using this bound, Hoeffding's inequality and a union bound, it follows that with probability 
Thus, by inequality (11), we are done.
Setting β = 1/50 in Lemma 4.6, we have established the first part of our proof outline, that if P = U d then with high probability X is not rejected at line 3. Setting β = 1 50 in Lemma 4.7 and
we have established the second part of our proof outline, that if X survives line 3 then with high probability X ∈ C, soT (X) = T (X). The main aspect remaining is to show that the amount of noise added toT (X) is small enough to still distinguish between P = U d and P − U d 1 ≥ α with constant probability.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The privacy guarantee was established in Lemma 4.5. It remains to prove that if P = U d then Algorithm 1 outputs ACCEPT with probability at least 2/3 (completeness) and that if P − U d 1 ≥ α then Algorithm 1 outputs REJECT with probability at least 2/3 (soundness).
Completeness: By Lemma 4.6, with probability 1 − 3β, if P = U d then we don't REJECT in line 3 and continue to line 8. If we choose ∆ 1/50 as in equation (17), then by Lemma 4.7 and union bound, with probability 1−3β −5β = 1−8β, X passes line 3 and X ∈ C, soT (X) = T (X). What remains to show is that with high probability, z 2 ≤ 1 4 n(n − 1)α 2 . Let r 2 ∼ Lap 4∆ 1/50 /ε as in line 8 of Algorithm 1. By Lemma 2.5, it holds that with probability at least 0.95, |r 2 | ≤ hold. Setting
we have |r 2 | ≤
. Then, with probability 0.95 − 8β,
α 2 , it holds that Pr z 2 ≥ n(n−1)α 2 4 ≤ 0.05. Therefore, with probability 0.9 − 8β,
holds and Algorithm 1 does not reject in line 8 either.
We conclude that if n = Ω
and it satisfies equation (18) at the same time, then with probability at least 0.9 − 8/50 > 2/3 Algorithm 1 outputs ACCEPT.
Soundness: Let us assume that the algorithm does not return REJECT in line 3, which is the desired output in this case. Similar to the completeness proof, for the chosen n of equation (18), with probability at least 0.95 − 5β, |r 2 | ≤ n(n−1)α 2 8 and the dataset X, which passes line 3, satisfies X ∈ C soT (X) = T (X). Then,
α 2 , it holds that Pr z 2 ≤ n(n−1)α 2 4 ≤ 0.05. So, with probability at least 0.9 − 5β = 0.9 − 5/50 > 2/3, Algorithm 1 will output REJECT in step 8. Therefore, the algorithm will output REJECT with overall probability at least 2/3.
We conclude that if
then Algorithm 1 can distinguish between the cases P = U d and P − U d 1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3. The final sample complexity guarantee follows by observing that (up to polylogarithmic factors) one of these terms can never dominate the asymptotic sample complexity. It remains to show the equivalence of the sample complexity obtained in (19) and that of the theorem statement which we do next.
Claim 4.8. For any choice of parameters d, α, ε,
αε .
Proof. Let us assume that
αε . Then
αε . By the AM-GM inequality, it holds that
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
A Computationally Efficient Private Algorithm
We next turn our attention to the computationally efficient algorithm, Algorithm 2. Notice that Algorithm 2 almost matches Algorithm 1 for the first three lines and the last two lines, so the main focus in this section will be a computationally efficient analogue of the Lipschitz extension step in Algorithm 1. By Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7, with high probability if
which is almost exactly the condition we put on the set C. Thus, if any data point in X does not satisfy the inner product condition in (20), we can REJECT the dataset. Algorithm 2 proceeds by first attempting to verify membership in C by privately counting the number of datapoints that violate condition (20) when compared to a private version ofX, calledX. We reject if the private test determines with high probability that there is a non-zero number of such points (lines 4-7). If X survives this step then Algorithm 2 attempts to ensure that X ∈ C by replacing data points that don't satisfy (20) (again compared to a noisyX) with draws from the uniform distribution (steps 8-12). Since X was already close to C, not many data points are changed so the resulting dataset,X, still looks like X but has bounded inner products with high probability. The Lipschitz extensionT (X) is thus replaced with T (X) and the remainder of the algorithm proceeds as in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 has a higher sample complexity than Algorithm 1. This arises in two places. Firstly, | X (j) ,X | can be an additive factor of d log(1/δ)/ε larger than | X (j) ,X |, which is the quantity we actually test. Also, when counting the number of points that violate condition (20), we incur an error of order d log(1/δ)/ε again, which means that X andX may be more different than we expect. This results in a d log(1/δ)/εα term that was not present in the sample complexity of the inefficient algorithm.
Unlike Algorithm 1, which satisfied pure differential privacy, Algorithm 2 as written will only satisfy approximate differential privacy. The δ term arises since there is a small probability that the projectionX could fail to be in C, in which case the amount of noise added to T (X) is insufficient for privacy. However, for hypothesis tests with constant error probabilities, sample complexity bounds for differential privacy are equivalent, up to constant factors, to sample complexity bounds for other notions of distributional algorithmic stability, such as (ε, δ)-
DP [DKM + 06], concentrated DP [DR16, BS16], KL-and TV-stability [WLF16, BNS + 16] (see [ASZ18, Lemma 5]). The transformation of a test from (ε, δ)-DP to O(ε)-DP given in [ASZ18]
is efficient so Algorithm 2 implies the existence of an efficient pure DP with the same sample complexity up to constant factors.
Theorem 4.9. Algorithm 2 is (4ε, 17δ)-differentially private and distinguishes between the cases P = U d versus P − U d 1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3, having sample complexity
We will focus first on proving that Algorithm 2 is (4ε, 17δ)-differentially private. The majority of the work in the proof will involve showing that with high probabilityX satisfies a property similar to equation (20) . Since this relies on previous steps, the privacy proof is not simply an
Algorithm 2 Efficient Private Uniformity Testing
Require: Sample X = (X (1) , . . . , X (n) ) ∈ {±1} n×d drawn from P n . Parameters ε, δ, α > 0. Lemma 4.10. Let X be a dataset that passes line 3 of Algorithm 2. Suppose U (j) ∼ U d for j ∈ [n]. Then with probability 1 − 5δ, for all j ∈ [n],
Lemma 4.11. Let X be a dataset that passes line 3 and line 7 of Algorithm 2. Then with probability 1 − 8δ, it holds that, for every point x ∈X,
Proof. Since X passed step 7 and by Lemma 2.5, with probability 1 − δ,
Therefore, X andX differ in at most 2 ε ln 1 δ data points, so for every x ∈X,
For any x that was resampled during line 10, that is, x = U (j) for some j ∈ [n], by Lemma 4.10, we are done. Otherwise, if x was not resampled then by assumption
Now,X −X = R where R ∼ N (0, σ 2 I d×d ) and σ = 8d ln(5/4δ)/ε. By symmetry,
where each Y i ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). Thus, with probability 1 − 2δ, for all x ∈ X,
Therefore, with probability 1 − 8δ, by inequalities (22) and (23), ∀x ∈X,
This completes the proof.
We have now shown that lines 3-7 with high probability either reject X or alter it to ensure that it satisfies (21), which is very similar to the membership condition for the set C from our Lipschitz extension in Algorithm 1. The following lemma, which follows directly from Lemma 4.4, says condition (21) is sufficient to ensure that T has sufficiently low sensitivity.
Lemma 4.12 (Sensitivity of T ). SupposeX,X ′ are two sample sets of size n, which differ in the nth data point. If bothX andX ′ satisfy Equation (21) then
We have now established that with high probability, if X survives until line 13 then this step adds enough noise to maintain privacy. The next lemma states that several of the other noise infusion steps are individually differentially private. Since these mechanisms are applications of well-known privacy mechanisms described in section 2.1, we will not include their proofs here.
Lemma 4.13. In the notation of Algorithm 2,
• the mechanism X → z 1 in line 2 is ε-DP,
• the mechanism X →X in line 4 is (ε, δ)-DP and
• Given a fixed (data independent)X, X → z 2 in line 7 is ε-DP.
We can now complete our proof of the privacy guarantees of Algorithm 2. As mentioned earlier, this is not simply an application of the composition theorem for differential privacy since the privacy guarantee of line 13 relies on the failure rates of earlier steps. Given two neighboring datasets X and X ′ , the proof couples the random variables in separate runs of Algorithm 2 on X and X ′ , to ensure thatX andX ′ are neighboring datasets so we can apply Lemma 4.12.
Lemma 4.14. Algorithm 2 is (4ε, 17δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Suppose X and X ′ differ on the nth data point. We can think of the random process that maps X toX as a series of random variables. We denote these random samples by (r 1 , R, r 2 , U, u n , r 3 ) where r 1 , R, r 2 and r 3 are as in Algorithm 2, U is the random samples that occur in line 12 on all data points except the nth data point and u n is the randomness potentially used on the nth data point in line 12. Note that since the algorithm can terminate before running the entire algorithm, not all runs of the algorithm will sample from all these random variables.
Let
If we denote the output of Algorithm 2 on dataset X with randomness (r 1 , R, r 2 , U, u n , r 3 ) by M (X | (r 1 , R, r 2 , U, u n , r 3 )) then for any r 1 , R, r 2 , U, u n and r 3 ,
Since the mechanism X →X + R is (ε, δ)-DP, there exists a set A such that Pr[R /
∈ A] ≤ δ and then Pr[(r 1 , R +X −X ′ , r 2 , U, u n , r 3 ) ∈ A] ≤ e ε Pr[(r 1 , R, r 2 , U, u n , r 3 ) ∈ A]. Let B 1 be the event that both X and X ′ pass line 3 and line 7 and B 2 be the event thatX andX ′ satisfy equation (21) 
1 holds then X is rejected in either line 3 or line 7. Since all the steps leading up to either of these lines are differentially private by Lemma 4.13, we have
Note that, E X,b is also equal to
so by the definition of A, B 1 and B 2 ,
Therefore,
We now turn to proving that Algorithm 2 distinguishes between the cases P = U d and P − U d 1 ≥ α with probability 2/3. The crux of the proof can be summarized as 1. If P = U d , then with high probability X passes the first check at line 3.
2. We can choose ∆ δ such that:
(a) If X passes line 3 then X =X with high probability, so T (X) = T (X). (b) The amount of noise added to T (X) is small enough that one can still distinguish between the two hypotheses.
Notice that these steps are almost identical to the inefficient proof withT (X) replaced with T (X). Since we needed to keep track of failure rates for our privacy proof, we already have most of the ingredients we need for this proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. The privacy guarantee was established in Lemma 4.14.
Completeness: Suppose P = U d . By Lemma 4.6, with probability 1 − 3δ, X survives line 3. Conditioned on surviving line 3, by Lemma 4.7, we have that ∀j ∈ [n] | X (j) ,X | ≤ ∆ δ , with probability 1 − 5δ. By inequality (24) and union bound, with probability 1 − 10δ, ∀j ∈ [n],
So, with probability 1
δ . Therefore, with probability 1 − 11δ, X survives lines 3 and 7 and none of the points get changed in lines 8-12, that is, X =X.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the remainder of the proof involves showing that for the given choice of n, it holds that
Then we would have that with probability 0.95, |r 3 | ≤ n(n−1)α 2 8
and if in addition n = Ω
α 2 , then we can show that the final test returns ACCEPT, with probability at least 0.9 − 11δ, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. For δ ≤ 0.02, this translates to success probability at least 2/3.
Condition (25) is satisfied when
Soundness: This follows exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Ignoring the polylogarithmic factors and by Claim 4.8, the sample complexity is simplified to
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.9.
Balanced Identity Testing of Product Distributions
In previous sections, we considered only testing whether an unknown product distribution is uniform. We will provide a generic reduction which preserves ℓ 2 -distance between means. In the case where the distributions are "balanced" (i.e., the coordinate means are bounded away from being −1 or 1), this will imply that our upper bounds carry over to this more general setting.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose we are given a known binary product distribution Q and a sample X ∼ P , where P is some unknown binary product distribution. There exists a (randomized) transformation Y = f Q (X) such that Y ∼ P ′ , where P ′ is some unknown binary product distribution such that
Proof. The transformation is as follows: for each coordinate
Otherwise, let Y i = 1 with probability
, and −1 with probability
Putting these cases together, we
Since each coordinate is independent, we have that Y ∼ P ′ , where P ′ is a binary product distribution with the same mean. Overall, this gives us that
, which allows us to conclude the desired statement.
Corollary 5.2. Let τ > 0 be some fixed constant, and c = c(τ ) be some sufficiently small constant (which depends on τ ). Let Q be some known product distribution over {±1} d , such that
Suppose there exists an algorithm which takes n samples from an unknown product distribution P ′ over {±1} d and can distinguish between the following two cases with probability at least 2/3:
Then there exists an algorithm which takes n samples from an unknown product distribution P over {±1} d and can distinguish between the following two cases with probability at least 2/3:
Proof. The proof will follow via Lemma 5.1: given a set of samples for the latter problem, we convert them via the method of Lemma 5.1, and run the given algorithm for the former problem. The former case is immediate, since equal product distributions will have equal mean vectors.
We thus consider the latter case, P −Q 1 ≥ α. The upper bound part of Lemma 2.8 implies
. We then argue that P ′ − U d 1 ≥ cα, which follows from the lower bound of Lemma 2.8 (applied with P and Q equal to our P ′ and U d , respectively), concluding the proof.
Extreme Product Distributions
In this section, we discuss algorithms and lower bounds for extreme product distributions. Roughly speaking, an extreme product distribution is a product distribution with marginal distributions which are sufficiently close to being deterministically either −1 or 1. More precisely, we have the following:
We often omit the dependence on the constant C and refer to extreme distributions.
We will show that, up to constant factors, the sample complexity of identity testing for extreme product distributions and identity testing for univariate distributions are the same. This statement holds even without privacy constraints, which we consider to be of independent interest. We will show this via a pair of sample-complexity preserving reductions, which will then allow us to immediately port results from the univariate private testing literature.
More precisely, we will show the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. For n = Ω((log d)/ε), there is an O(n)-sample ε-differentially private algorithm for testing identity to any distribution Q univ over [d] if and only if there is an O(n)-sample ε-differentially private algorithm for testing identity to any extreme product distributions Q prod over {±1} d .
This will be proven through a combination of Lemma 6.4 in Section 6.1, and Lemma 6.7 in Section 6.2. With Theorem 6.2 in place, we can conclude the following corollary, which is a consequence of the corresponding statements for private univariate testing in [ASZ18] .
Corollary 6.3. For every extreme product distribution Q ∈ {±1} d , there exists an ε-differentially private algorithm which takes
samples from some unknown product distribution P ∈ {±1} d and distinguishes between the cases where P = Q and P − Q 1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3. Furthermore, every algorithm which has the same guarantees requires Ω(n) samples from P , as long as ε =Ω(1/d).
Reducing from Extreme Product Testing to Univariate Testing
In this section, we show the following, which shows that any univariate identity testing algorithm implies a multivariate identity testing algorithm for extreme product distributions. 1 Lemma 6.4. There exists a constant γ ∈ (0, 1] (depending only on the parameter C of extreme distributions) such that the following holds. If there is an n-sample ε-DP algorithm for testing identity to a distribution Q univ over [d] (with distance parameter γα), then there is an n ′ -sample ε-DP algorithm for testing identity to extreme product distributions over {±1} d (with distance parameter α) where n ′ = O(n + (log d)/ε).
Proof. For convenience and ease of notation, we hereafter consider distributions over {0, 1} d instead of the equivalent choice {±1} d , as this allows us to map more easily mean vectors of product distributions to probability vectors of univariate distributions. Fix C ≥ 0, and suppose there exists an algorithm A for testing identity (with distance parameter α) to distributions over [d] , with sample complexity n(α). Given a fixed C-extreme product distribution Q prod (with mean vector q ∈ [0, 1] d ) over {±1} d , and n samples from an unknown product distribution P over {±1} d (with unknown mean vector p ∈ [0, 1] d ), the claimed algorithm to test identity to Q prod works as follows. First, without loss of generality (and up to flipping the corresponding coordinates in all samples from P ), one can assume that 0
The first step is to apply the differentially private algorithms from Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6, with constant probability of failure 1/10 and privacy parameter ε/3 (and, for the second algorithm, for τ set to max(1, C)), to the samples of P , and reject immediately if either test rejects (This spends a total "privacy budget" of 2ε/3, so that we still have ε/3 to use in the rest, when calling the univariate purported tester). These two tests are simultaneously correct with probability at least 4/5; we then can continue assuming p ∞ ≤ 1/2 and p 1 ≤ 8 max(1, C). For any of the n samples X (1) , . . . , X (n) ∼ P :
• If X (i) = 0, then output a sample with value Y i ← d + 1;
• If X (i) = 1, i.e., X (i) has exactly one non-zero coordinate, then output a sample Y i with the value of this coordinate;
• If X (i) > 1, then output a sample with value
This therefore generates n i.i.d. samples from some distribution P univ over [d+2]. Moreover, since Q prod is fully known, the corresponding distribution Q univ (which one would obtain by applying this transformation to samples from Q prod ) is uniquely specified and known; the algorithm then invokes the univariate identity tester A on the n i.i.d. samples Y 1 , . . . , Y n to test identity to Q univ .
• If P = Q prod , then we have P univ = Q univ .
• If P − Q prod 1 > α, then P univ − Q univ 1 > γα, where γ := e −C 8(1+16 max(1,C)) . To prove this statement, we denote by e j the j-th vector of the canonical basis of R d and observe that by definition
, then we are good; otherwise, |P (0) − Q prod (0)| ≤ γα, from which we can bound the second term as
Observing that the function f :
where for the last inequality we used the fact that Q prod is C-extreme to bound Q prod (0), and the fact that 16 max(1, C) )γ, and therefore (recalling the folklore subadditive bound on total variation distance with regard to product distributions)
as claimed.
Correctness then follows from that of the purported univariate identity tester, called with privacy parameter ε/3 and failure probability 1/5 (so that by a union bound, the overall correctness is 3/5, and the whole procedure is ε-differentially private).
It only remains to provide the proofs of the two helper subroutines we used in the reduction:
Lemma 6.5. There is an ε-differentially private algorithm which can distinguish between the cases that a product distribution over {0, 1} d with mean vector p has p ∞ ≤ 1/4 versus p ∞ ≥ 1/2 using n samples, for n = O((log d)/ε).
Proof. This will follow by an application of Report Noisy Max (see [DR14] ). Draw n = Ω( log d ε ) samples from the product distribution, and consider the d functions f 1 , . . . , f d , where f i computes the empirical marginal distribution for coordinate i. Note that each f i has sensitivity 1/n, so by the guarantees of Report Noisy Max, it is ε-differentially private to outputf i * max i∈ [d] f i + Lap(1/nε). By a Chernoff bound, union bound, and tail bounds on Laplace random variables, the difference betweenf i and p i will be bounded by O( (log d)/n+(log d)/(nε)), simultaneously for all i ∈ [d], with probability at least 99/100. By choosing n = Ω((log d)/ε), we upper-bound this error term by 1/8. Therefore, thresholding the value off i * at the value 3/8 will distinguish the two cases, as desired.
Lemma 6.6. For any τ ≥ 1, there is an ε-differentially private algorithm which can distinguish between the cases that a product distribution over {0, 1} d with mean vector p has p 1 ≤ τ versus p 1 ≥ 8τ using n samples, for n = O(1/ε).
Proof. The algorithm will first draw n samples, and compute the fraction f of these draws which have at least 8τ ones. Note that this statistic has sensitivity 1/n, so to privatize it, we can add a Lap(1/nε) random variable, giving us a statisticf . If the result is at most 3/8, then we output that p 1 ≤ τ , else, we output that p 1 ≥ 8τ .
Let r be the probability that a single string has at least 4τ ones. We start by showing that there exists a gap in the value of r in the two cases. Let N denote the number of 1's is a randomly drawn string from p. We have E[X] ≤ τ and E[X] ≥ 8τ ≥ 8 in the two cases, respectively. By Markov's inequality, this means that in the first case, r ≤ 1/4. Moreover, a simple computation shows that Var
, so that, by Chebyshev's inequality, in the second case we get 1
, and therefore r ≥ 1/2. By a Chernoff bound and a tail bound on Laplace random variables, the difference between thef and r will be bounded by O(1/ √ n + 1/(nε)). If we choose n = Ω(1/ε), we upper bound this error term by 1/16, and thresholding at 3/8 will distinguish the two cases, as desired.
Reducing from Univariate Testing to Extreme Product Testing
In this section, we will prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6.7. There exists an absolute constant c > 0 such that the following holds. If there is a cn-sample algorithm for testing identity to any extreme product distribution Q prod over {±1} d , then there is an n-sample algorithm for testing identity to any distribution
Moreover, if the former algorithm is ε-DP, then so is the latter.
This will be established via a sequence of reductions: from univariate testing to Poissonized univariate testing (Lemma 6 .8), to extreme product testing (Lemma 6.9); before one final observation letting us get rid of one assumption stemming from the last reduction (Remark 6.10). We describe these reductions in the following subsections.
Univariate to Poissonized Univariate
The first reduction we perform is from having a dataset of fixed size, to drawing a dataset of variable size. This technique is known as "Poissonization," and is folklore in the distribution testing literature (see, e.g., [Can15, Appendix D.3] ). We include the argument here for completeness. Drawing a random number of samples (Poi(n)), rather than a fixed budget (n), has the advantage that the frequency of each symbol i ∈ [d] will be distributed as Poi(n · P i ), independently. At the same time, with high probability, Poi(n) ≤ O(n), so one can simulate drawing Poi(n) samples with a fixed budget, at the cost of a constant factor overhead.
Lemma 6.8. If there is an algorithm which draws Poi(n) samples and tests identity to a distribution Q univ over [d] with probability of failure at most δ (and distance parameter α), then there is a 2n-sample algorithm for testing identity to Q univ with probability of failure at most δ + 1/10 (and distance parameter α).
Proof. Consider the algorithm which draws N ∼ Poi(n) samples. With high probability, this will draw at most 2n samples. More precisely (see, e.g., [Can17] ), we have that Pr[N ≥ 2n] ≤ exp − n 2 2n = exp − n 2 . For n larger than some absolute constant, this is less than an arbitrarily small constant.
With this in mind, we describe the 2n-sample algorithm. It begins by drawing its own N ∼ Poi(n). If N > 2n, it outputs arbitrarily. Otherwise, it runs the algorithm which takes Poi(n) samples, on a set of N samples (drawn uniformly at random from its set of 2n samples). Correctness follows from correctness of the Poissonized tester: the only change is that the probability of failure increases by Pr[N > 2n], which as argued before, will be less than an arbitrarily small constant (e.g., 1/10) for n greater than some absolute constant.
Poissonized Univariate to Extreme Product
For convenience and ease of notation, we hereafter consider distributions over {0, 1} d instead of the equivalent choice {±1} d .
Lemma 6.9. Fix any constant C ≥ 1. Suppose n ≥ c log d, where c > 0 is a suitably large absolute constant. If there is an algorithm which takes n samples and tests identity to a distribution Q prod on {0, 1} d with probability of failure at most δ (and distance parameter α ′ := e C α/2), then there is an algorithm which draws Poi(2n) samples and tests identity to any univariate distribution such that Q univ ∞ ≤ C/d, with probability of failure at most δ + 1/10 (and distance parameter α). Moreover, if the former algorithm is ε-DP, then so is the latter.
In addition, as will be clear from the proof below, the reduction then guarantees that the product distribution Q prod obtained from such Q univ will satisfy E[Q prod ] ∞ ≤ C/d, i.e., is a C-extreme product distribution. Therefore, the above reduction holds even when only requiring a testing algorithm for identity to extreme product distributions.
Proof. Consider the following process: taking Poi(2n) samples from a univariate distribution
. Clearly, the random variables N ′ 1 , . . . , N ′ d are mutually independent, and further
, by properties of Poisson random variables and since 
that is, the number of coordinates set to 1 among the first M . We then have T i ∼ Bin(M, p i /(1+ p i )); further, conditioned on M , all the T i 's are independent.
The outcome of this process is then a (d + 1)-tuple (M, T 1 , . . . , T d ); we convert this into M i.i.d. samples from the product distribution P prod on {0,
in the natural way, by building an M -by-d binary matrix with exactly T i ones in the i-th column, before permuting independently and uniformly at random each column.
To conclude, we claim that as long as n ≥ c log d (for some absolute constant c > 0), then
10 . This follows from concentration of Poisson r.v.'s (again, see e.g., [Can17] ) and a union bound over the d i.i.d. random variables M 1 , . . . , M d . The tester for Q univ then proceeds as follows: given Poi(2n) samples from an unknown P over [d] , it applies the above procedure and, with probability at least 9/10, succeeds in producing n i.i.d. samples from the distribution P prod over {0,
; it then runs the identity tester for Q univ on those n samples. (When the reduction procedure fails, i.e., when M < n, then the tester outputs arbitrarily.) Correctness then follows from the below observations:
• If P = Q univ , then P prod = Q prod ;
The first item is obvious; we hereafter establish the second. Denoting by e j the j-th standard vector of the canonical basis of {0, 1} d , and by 0 the all-zero vector, we have
(and similarly for q ′ i ) for conciseness. If the first term, |P prod (0) − Q prod (0)|, is greater than e −C α/2, then we are done. Otherwise, we have, by the triangle inequality,
using that d j=1 p j = 1. However, since we had assumed Q univ ∞ ≤ C/d, we can bound
, and thus overall P prod − Q prod 1 ≥ e −C 2 α in this case too.
Remark 6.10. The reader may observe that the "if and only if " statement of Theorem 6.2 does not seem to quite follow from the combination of Lemmata 6.4 and 6.7. Indeed, the latter only establishes that a private identity testing algorithm for extreme product distributions yields a private identity testing algorithm for univariate distributions with small infinity norm. However, this is not an issue, as a standard reduction due to Goldreich [Gol16] shows that any univariate uniformity testing algorithm implies a general univariate identity testing algorithm with only a constant loss in parameters; and this reduction preserves differential privacy. Theorem 6.2 thus follows from combining this last reduction with Lemma 6.7.
Lower Bounds
In this section, we state information-theoretic lower bounds for differentially private testing in high dimensions. While the following theorem is stated for uniformity testing of product distributions, it also holds for the more general problem of identity testing, as well as the related problem of Gaussian mean testing. Recall that we also proved a lower bound on the complexity of identity testing as Corollary 6.3 in Section 6, though the instance considered there is an "extreme" product distribution (i.e., not the uniform distribution).
Theorem 7.1. Any ε-differentially private algorithm which draws n samples from an unknown product distribution P ∈ {±1} d and, with probability at least 2/3, distinguishes between the cases P = Q and P − Q 1 ≥ α where Q is the uniform distribution over {±1} d , requires
The first term in the lower bound is the non-private sample complexity of this problem [CDKS17, DDK18] , and the third term is the sample complexity of testing uniformity of a Bernoulli distribution (see, e.g., [ASZ18] ).
A An Efficient Private Algorithm for Gaussian Mean Testing
We present in full our computationally efficient private algorithm for multivariate Gaussian mean testing (Algorithm 3). In this setting, P is a multivariate Gaussian distribution with identity covariance matrix and unknown mean, that is, P = N (µ, I d×d ) for some unknown µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ d ) ∈ R d . By drawing samples from P , we aim to distinguish between the cases P = N (0, I d×d ) and P − N (0, I d×d ) 1 ≥ α, with probability at least 2/3. Algorithm 3 uses a noisy version of the same statistic that is used in the non-private folklore test and in our uniformity testing algorithms from Section 4:
For any two neighboring datasets X ∼ X ′ differing on the n-th sample, the sensitivity of T is bounded by
This follows from inequality (10) in the proof of Lemma 4.4. By this bound, the desired condition that datasets must satisfy in order for T to have low sensitivity -a condition similar to (20) -is
If indeed P = N (0, I d×d ), then, with high probability, condition (28) is satisfied. Following the same thinking as with uniformity testing, Algorithm 3 performs the same type of tests and modifications to make sure the dataset satisfies a condition similar to (28) before and if it reaches the final test, which involves the statistic T .
The additional challenge of multivariate Gaussian mean testing is that the samples are not bounded. While truncating the samples is necessary, we also need to ensure that any Gaussian dataset will likely remain unchanged through the execution of the algorithm, so that the final test, which involves the statistic T , is accurate. To achieve this, we estimate the low sensitivity quantity |m i (X)| = 1 n | n j=1 ½{X (j) i ≤ 0} − n 2 |, which, for Gaussian datasets, acts as a proxy for the mean of the i-th coordinate. Due to the good concentration properties of Gaussian random variables, the datasets that pass the test of line 5 are guaranteed to lie in a small range [−B, B] with high probability, so that the truncation, which follows in line 6, will not change any of the samples. The new bound B comes in the new condition (28), as we will define ∆ G δ = B 2 ∆ δ . The main theorem of this section is the following: Theorem A.1. Algorithm 3 is (5ε, 21δ)-differentially private and for P = N (µ, I d×d ) it distinguishes between the cases P = N (0, I d×d ) and P − N (0, I d×d ) 1 ≥ α with probability at least 2/3, having sample complexity
First, we prove the guarantees of the non-private test, on which our algorithm is based.
Lemma A.2 (Non-private Test Guarantees). For T defined as in (26), the following hold:
• E[T (X)] = n 2 µ 2 2 .
• Var(T (X)) = 2n 2 d + 4n 3 µ 2 2 .
Proof. We have, recalling that P has identity covariance matrix, that it is a product distribution with i-th marginal distributed as N (µ i , 1),
Var(X We can now prove that if P = N (0, I d×d ), then X will pass the first two tests with high probability.
Lemma A.7. With probability 1−6δ, if P = N (0, I d×d ) then Algorithm 3 does not reject neither in line 5, nor in line 11.
Proof. , with probability at least 1 − 2δ. It follows that, with probability 1 − 2δ,
Let r 1 ∼ Lap(1/εn) as in Algorithm 3. By Lemma 2.5, with probability 1 − δ, |r 1 | ≤ ln(1/δ) εn . Combined with (32), we get that, with probability 1 − 3δ,
showing that the dataset X will pass line 5. For the test of line 11, we first observe that, since P = N (0, I d×d ), E[X i ] = 0 for all i ∈ [d] and that, due to the truncation in line 6, for all the samples it holds that |X showing that the dataset X will pass line 11. Therefore, X will pass both the test in line 5 and the test in line 11, with probability 1 − 6δ.
Using Lemma A.6, we can also prove that all Gaussian datasets that pass the first two tests remain unchanged for the rest of the algorithm. The following lemma states that the dataset will not be modified during the truncation phase in line 6.
Lemma A.8. Suppose P = N (µ, I d×d ). If dataset X passes line 5 of Algorithm 3, then, with probability 1 − 5δ, no truncation occurs in line 6.
Proof. Since X passed line 5, it holds that z 1 = max 
Soundness: Suppose P = N (µ, I d×d ) and P − N (0, I d×d ) 1 ≥ α. Let us assume that the algorithm does not return REJECT in line 1, 5, or 11, which is the desired output in this case. Since X has passed line 11, by Lemma A.8 and Lemma A.9, with probability 1 − 10δ, X does not get truncated in line 6 and for all x ∈ X, | x,X | ≤ ∆ G δ . Similar to the completeness proof, with probability 0.95 − 13δ, the dataset reaches the last test in line 22 unchanged and for the chosen n, |r 4 | ≤ n 2 α 2 8·81 . Before proving the accuracy of the last test in line 22, note that since P − N (0, I d×d ) 1 ≥ α, by Lemma 2.7, we have that µ 2 2 ≥ α 2 /81. So, by Lemma A.2, ≤ 0.05. So with probability 0.9 − 13δ, z 4 > n 2 α 2 324 . Thus, for δ ≤ 0.01 and for the stated value of n, we conclude that with probability 2/3, Algorithm 3 returns REJECT.
Ignoring the logarithmic factors, the sample complexity is simplified using Claim 4.8.
